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This special issue explores changes in the nature of tripartite arrangements between firms, 
governments and organized labour across the last century, focusing on their post-1945 heyday.  
Although tripartism has its origins at the turn of the Twentieth Century, the post-1945 long boom 
represented an historical high-water mark that may now be seen as quite distinct from our own long 
period of volatility and crisis.  Historical concerns are frequently stimulated by those of the present 
and this is especially the case in contemporary history.
1
  Anglo-Saxon historians may feel that the 
age of tripartism is at an end, but the contributions within this issue show that although this may 
accurately reflect current perceptions, tripartism continues , albeit often in weak forms, in other 
national and transnational contexts; its history therefore retains contemporary resonance.   
 In our present age, it is commonly assumed that the relative power of employers has 
increased at the expense of government – the central co-ordinating actor in tripartism – and 
organized labour. Within the firm, not only workers, but also traditional managers have been 
displaced by assertive investors and allied to them, a new managerial class that has little emotional 
capital sunk in the firm other than as a vehicle for shareholder value maximization or release, and 
personal enrichment.  From the business historian’s viewpoint, these assumptions raise a number of 
issues surrounding long term trends and diversity in the nature of the capitalist ecosystem within 
which tripartism is located.   In this connection, there are four alternative points of view on broad 
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approaches to labour management. The first, rooted in the then apparent solidity of the British 
postwar tripartite settlement, was that the incorporation of labour’s institutions was structurally 
essential to the state’s role in avoiding or genuinely resolving crises.2  The second sees tripartism as 
very much an historical exception, representing to a large extent a product of a very specific set of 
historic circumstances around the Great Depression and the post-World War Two long boom.
3
 The 
third, a variant of the second, would see historic compromises between state, the firm, and workers 
as a reflection of the thirty year period of relative global prosperity and growth which had deeper 
historic roots stretching back at least into the Nineteenth Century.
4
 The fourth highlights national 
diversity in global capitalism and views the labour management options adopted according not only 
to temporal trends but also to such dimensions as space, scale, and global centre-periphery 
relations.
5
  The latter view implies that elements of post-war compromises may persist, even if, 
within many of the advanced societies, they do so in dilute form.
6
     
 
Tripartism as historical exception 
Tripartism almost by definition requires a polity within which élites are prepared to institutionalize 
compromise with labour.  Yet a very wide and diverse body of thinking from across the political 
spectrum suggests that the normal condition of society for centuries has been characterized by 
labour repression, entailing the extraction by relatively small élites of the bulk of any surplus 
generated.   The great theorist of American slavery, John Calhoun, defended it through the assertion 
that labour coercion was encountered in all societies, and that modern slavery represented a 
relatively benign form in that it ostensibly encompassed welfare commitments on the behalf of 
masters which were absent under the impersonal relations of wage labour.
7
 This view, of course, 
challenges the arguments that labour coercion both under slavery and more widely is often 
irrationally cruel since human property was often wilfully damaged by its owners.
8
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More generally speaking, it can be argued that élites are extremely reluctant to compromise even 
when the alternatives are social disorder or war.  Marx believed that though repression had hitherto 
been universal, general emancipation was possible, and, indeed that wage labour already 
represented an improvement on any previous form of production. He was also notoriously skeptical 
of the possibility of meaningful reform and class compromises.  Why then, were the great 
compromises of the post war settlement constructed? The weight of opinion here is that they 
reflected a highly specific set of circumstances. In the Anglo-Saxon economies, labour had been 
hugely strengthened by rearmament, war and an anti-fascist ideological consensus.   The inter-war 
Great Depression and the rise and collapse of fascism compromised the legitimacy of defenders of 
untrammeled corporate power, and highlighted the exhaustion of policy alternatives short of class 
compromise.   A policy alternative that had been advocated by organized labour in Germany and 
Britain since the late Nineteenth Century, that is the partial integration of unions into national 
government decision making, was therefore adopted.
9
  Strong foundations had already been laid in 
the inter-war period and were strengthened in wartime in Britain and the USA.
10
  In the Cold War 
era, a strong social democratic movement was widely seen as a vital bulwark against the spread of 
communism.
11
   
 At a somewhat less meta theoretical level, a range of contemporary accounts within the 
political economy and employment relations literature suggests that not only has the position of 
workers and their representatives been worsening for many years, and markedly so in the period 
following the oil price shock of the mid-1970s, but also that such trends are very difficult or 
impossible to reverse.
12
  In the Twenty-First Century, trade union density in Britain is reverting to 
its position a century ago, arguably its secular mean.
13
 This reflects the extraordinary strengthening 
of capital during the “third wave” of globalization, forcing all countries onto a neo-liberal path. 
Even more pessimistic variations of this point of view suggest that the ultimate outcomes may be 
large scale starvation, authoritarianism and war.
14
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Relative prosperity and elites 
A second point of view would be that tripartite compromises reflect changes in élite composition 
and/or strategies which, in turn, are conditioned by overall economic growth.  Elite composition 
approaches encompass the work of Priestland and recent work by Karel Williams and colleagues at 
Manchester.
15
   These theories draw on a strong historical patrimony developed by Barrington 
Moore Jr who famously documented the historic linkages between governing bourgeoisies and 
democratic institutions in major economies, noting the significance of the absence of both.
16
  
Priestland assumes that élites tend to be divided between merchant/capitalists, militarists and 
intellectuals.
17
   Only when the latter are in leadership – which is only likely to occur when the 
former two groups have succeeded in utterly exhausting and discrediting themselves - are class 
compromises likely.    
 Williams and colleagues focus on the extent to which in recent years financial interests may 
capture policy-making processes and are able to exert influence largely independent of democratic 
constraints.
18
  Wood and Lane argue that during periods of economic crisis, owners of highly 
fungible assets are likely to assume predominance over more patient investors, and those with sunk 
capital (traditional managers and workers) within the firm.
19
  The argument finds historic support 
from the differential support that diverse élite groups afforded Nazism in inter-war Germany.
20
   
Wood and Lane reject the view that the present age represents a return to rentier power, however, as 
investors with highly fungible assets include sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), who are opening up a 
new type of statism which simply bypasses corporatist arrangements.  In most cases, behaviour will 
not be far removed from that of traditional rentiers.
21
  However, some SWFs, most notably 
Norway’s, pursue a social agenda that might be conducive to compromise at firm, but not at societal 
level.  Others encompass thinly-veiled foreign policy ambitions, which have little to do with 
traditional firm practice.  However, the picture is a far from uniform one as labour stakeholders do 
tend to encourage dialogue or compromise with worker interests at firm level.
22
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 An important new book by Piketty presents a somewhat different viewpoint.
23
 Piketty is, in 
common with theorists of near-inevitable labour coercion, somewhat skeptical as to the possibilities 
of meaningful class compromises other than in very particular circumstances. However, in his study 
of wealth spanning the last three centuries, he argues that in hard economic times, societal 
inequality has risen as élites concentrate their resources in speculative rather than productive 
investment.  In contrast, in times of growth such as the thirty-year post-war boom, the societal base 
of consumption widens, making more productive investment attractive; this, in turn, increases 
workers’ bargaining power, encouraging class compromise.  As the rate of return on financial assets 
invariably exceeds the rate of growth, when, as in the present, growth is low, social inequality 
widens.
24
  This makes for further concentration of wealth and power in the hands of élites, reducing 
the likelihood of social compromises.  
 
Tripartism and scale 
A limitation of the preceding sets of arguments is that they are, above all, temporal theories, linking 
the relative power of societal groupings to long-term shifts in the nature of capitalism in the 
advanced economies. A central reference point for much of the literature on comparative capitalism 
has been developed and, in particular, coordinated markets - the Rhineland economies and 
Scandinavia – where stakeholder rights are relatively strong. As firms are bound by dense or 
“thick” ties to a range of societal interests, mirrored by societal level institutions, they are founded 
on long-term compromises and ongoing reconstructive deals between state, business and labour.
25
 
These societies, in which tripartism is a more or less ‘natural’ state of affairs, remain an analytic 
reference point that stands in sharp contrast to that of the Anglo-Saxon model. Yet current theories 
of comparative capitalism highlight the extent to which very different types of capitalism, with 
quite distinct forms of societal relations (and not simply the Rhineland or Anglo-Saxon forms) may 
coexist in different national settings across the globe.
26
   This would suggest that tripartite deals are 
possible across a much wider range of contexts internationally than has often been assumed.   
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 The post 2008- economic crisis reopened debate as to the relative embeddedness of national 
institutions, and the degree of ‘path dependence’ to be found in different national settings.  
Pessimistic accounts, such as that of Streeck, suggest that broad historical trends towards the 
dissolution of non-financial ties ultimately over-ride distinct national historical legacies, leading to 
the gradual unravelling of more coordinated types of capitalism.
27
  In contrast, and informed by the 
radical economic geography literature, ‘variegated capitalism’ approaches highlight the tensions 
between a global capitalist ecosystem, and nation-specific forms of institutional mediation.
28
  Thus, 
social democratic régimes on the ‘global periphery’ have proven capable of building institutional 
frameworks that incorporate labour via tripartite mechanisms and which have also been associated 
with a degree of economic success.
29
  In Russia, an alternative specific form of ‘social partnership’ 
persists, reflected in an agreement with the International Labour Organisation, dubbed ‘coercive 
corporatism’, which also embodies weak forms of tripartism.30    
 In practical terms, it can further be argued that supra-national and national institutions are at 
best loosely coupled. Consequently, for example, the seemingly overwhelming power of 
international financial institutions varies greatly from setting to setting; many Asian nations and 
Russia sought to stockpile foreign exchange reserves in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
precisely to avoid having to accept IMF policy prescriptions in the future.  Moreover, the uneven 
and declining nature of US influence has ensured that the political evangelization of neo-liberalism 
has been decreasingly well-received. Finally, as Morgan notes, Multi-National Enterprises choose 
to invest in countries for a range of reasons, from natural resources through market access to a 
desire to benefit from particular local production regimes.
31
 The relative draw of these factors (and, 
in particular, the relative strength of the latter) will, in turn, impact on the extent to which firms 
make strategic compromises and associated adjustments in organizational practices according to 
setting. All this would suggest that some national governments have much more power - and, 
indeed, greater incentives - to engage in tripartite deals, than others.  In the case of Western 
companies purchasing goods from low-wage countries, as we illustrate below, they have responded 
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to concerns by ethical investors, consumer opinion and other companies to push developing-world 
governments for, and to participate in tripartite deals. 
 This might suggest closer examination of the historic development of types of capitalism 
across the world and how it has conditioned corporatist arrangements such as tripartism.   Study of 
the Latin American experience suggests the importance of political conjunctures within the state 
construction process which gave rise to such weak tripartite phenomena as Peronism in Argentina; 
more recent conjunctures have also evoked similarly labour-oriented state responses with 
complementary inputs sought from other civil society actors.
32
  Recent analyses have stressed the 
relationship between institutionalization and economic segmentation outside of the advanced 
economies.   
 Although there have been numerous attempts to categorize emerging markets around the 
world into distinct capitalist archetypes - for example, Hierarchical Market Economies and 
Segmented Business Systems – a common strand in such categorizations is of structural internal 
economic divides, and uneven institutional coverage.
33
  Although democratic transitions - for 
example those which followed immediately on from African independence in the 1960s or the post-
Apartheid transition in South Africa - may encourage tripartite deal making, such deals tend to be 
somewhat short-lived.  Whilst organized business may initially favour arrangements of this type to 
secure stability through transitions, a bedding-down of the new order means that compromises are 
invariably challenged at the expense of workers’ organisations.    When such deals retain their form, 
uneven regulation and enforcement may result in limited coverage.   This does not mean however 
that tripartism has entirely disappeared even in these countries, nor does it remove it as a viable 
option elsewhere.   
 Structures are reconstituted and remoulded through actors’ strategic choices. Although a 
favourable social, economic and political environment may allow more room for novelty and 
creativity in such choices, even in bleak times, the possibility and type of social compromise at least 
in part reflects decisions by unions and other social actors.   This does not mean that an optimal set 
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of best practices for unions exists that is readily transposable between contexts and periods, as has 
been highlighted by the very mixed record of organizing unionism outside of California.  However, 
political actions within and in support of tripartite mechanisms by some trade union movements in 
Latin America were pursued  with success during the democratic transitions at the end of the 
Twentieth Century and, as Sandbrook and colleagues demonstrate, in other settings where popular 
movements have acted in concert with unions to pressure élites.
34
  Thus, the contemporary situation 
at global level is one of the uneven application of weaker forms of tripartism.   
 
Variations in tripartism: evidence from around the world 
Tripartism remains a set of arrangements that is integral to the ‘European model’ of industrial 
relations.
35
 Three of the articles published here make significant contributions to the 
transnational history of European tripartism in the comparative and supra-national meanings 
of the ‘transnational’ term.36  Chris Minns and Marian Rizov operate on a broad temporal and 
spatial canvas to examine tripartism’s impact on wage moderation and dispersion since 1970.  
They show that, notwithstanding the importance of national institutional effects, government 
involvement in wage bargaining generally led to increased wage moderation and reduced 
wage dispersion across the countries they investigated, and that this effect persisted even 
when the institutional basis for it was eroded or disappeared. The return to Belle Ēpoque 
levels of social inequality in many of the advanced societies vests this finding with particular 
importance; tripartite deal-making around wages and related conditions of work, at least in 
this period, represented a proven policy mechanism for promoting greater equity – and a more 
sustainable basis for consumption – without entering unchartered policy waters. Moreover, 
not only did these arrangements encourage wage moderation; they also created the conditions 
for enhanced productivity in manufacturing industry, a lesson that present-day Britain, with 
stagnant or declining wages for the bulk of the population, and stagnating productivity rates 
might heed.  Centralised bargaining did not, as some industrial relations researchers have 
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suggested, lead to relatively large increases for union members but rather created ‘concertina’ 
effects. Tripartism was in this sense part of a virtuous circle in the period which continued to 
have lingering and positive consequences even well after the Golden Age itself ended.   
 Thomas Prosser and Emmanuelle Perrin contribute an article on the historical 
development of tripartism at the EU level which tends to confirm the strong reservations some 
scholars have expressed on the effectiveness of this level of ‘social dialogue’.37 Their article 
examines the ‘new phase’ of the European social dialogue’s credentials as a system of 
European tripartism, judging it against four essential criteria. They concur with De Boer et al. 
on its broadening and de-intensification; though the ‘new phase’ of the social dialogue has 
broached innovative topics, its outputs are peripheral and its implementation patchy. Prosser 
and Perrin reflect on the difficulties associated with transnational tripartism and the increasing 
dilution of the European social dialogue, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
One especially interesting aspect of the article is the backlight that it throws on the national 
history of tripartism: its marginality and weak piecemeal implementation has represented little 
impediment to tripartism’s persistence. In other words, challenges to the social model in 
Europe co-exist with remarkably persistent specific features. Again, pressures to develop pan-
Eurozone governance features may create a new political space for new forms of tripartism, 
even if the prospect seems relatively remote at the time of writing. 
 Guglielmo Meardi, Juliusz Gardawski and Oscar Molina adopt a comparative transnational 
historical approach to compare the evolution of weakly-institutionalised forms of tripartism 
subsequent on transitions to democracy (soon followed by European Union integration) in Spain 
and Poland, showing the referential significance of the former case for the latter.  Despite 
widespread criticism of tripartism’s functioning in both cases, the authors concur with Hassel’s 
more measured estimation of these arrangements’ function in ‘Eastern’ Europe.38 The authors argue 
for Tripartism’s stabilizing and ‘foundational’ function and point out the arrangements’ longevity in 
both national cases.  While certain structural constraints are identified by the authorial team, the 
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durability of these limited forms of tripartism appear to illustrate its functionality and certainly 
show its viability in rather diverse national contexts with very distinctive historical legacies.   
 Jimmy Donaghey and Paul Teague review the rise and fall of the Irish experiment in social 
partnership.  Initially, it led to a “benign” period of productivity-driven growth. Foreign 
manufacturing multinationals operating in Ireland provided an engine for the revival of 
manufacturing, but nonetheless did not generate pressures for better and more supportive 
institutions, as they could draw on their own internal capabilities.  Moreover, they were drawn to 
Ireland for reasons (such as a favourable tax regime and market access) that had little to do with the 
national production régime, and had few incentives to reform or deepen the latter.  Ultimately, the 
increased stranglehold of financial services on the Irish economy undermined the partnership’s 
functionality; returns from financial speculation eclipsed what could be accrued from deploying 
capital productively and the social compromises this may have entailed.   This made it easy for 
employers and the state to abandon it during the 2008 economic crisis, ironically making any move 
to a more balanced economy more difficult. 
 Two further articles published here deal with extra-European manifestations of tripartism.  
Bernard Gann, David Morgan and Peter Sheldon explore the development of Singaporean 
tripartism. This reflected the desire of government to bolster its social legitimacy and foster growth 
whilst marginalizing political opposition; the subordination of organized labour was achieved 
through inclusion.  The emerging order was built on traditional cultural values and the desire for 
social cohesion: the resultant system of “enforceable benevolence” brought with it both economic 
and social advances, but these were linked with political developments that were very different 
from the post-war social democracies of Europe.    As is the case with corporatism, tripartism does 
not necessarily rest on fully democratic institutions; rather, it can serve as a policy tool to help 
facilitate social stability and hence, diminish pressures for radical political reform. Given that gross 
social inequality is ultimately difficult to sustain without constant war or repression, this is a lesson 
that many current Western governments might heed.  
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 Geoffrey Wood, Gilton Klerk and Pauline Dibben contribute on Southern Africa where 
Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa all experimented with tripartite initiatives during the 
democratization period.  Whilst in all instances this brought secure and significant improvements in 
worker rights, relative enforceability reflected variations in state capabilities and political will.   
Ultimately, none of the experiments brought about the far-reaching class compromises which many 
believe are ultimately necessary to secure social stability in these societies characterized by 
extraordinarily high levels of social inequality.   The authors ascribe this to neo-liberalism’s policy 
hegemony, shifting élite composition (with the rise of political entrepreneurs once liberation had 
been secured), dominant partyism, and the extent to which rising commodity prices have removed 
urgency from the need to find economic solutions.   However, mineral price volatility and the often 
negative effects growth in mineral extraction has elsewhere in national economies underscores the 
relevance of a type of social compromise that has been, in other contexts, associated with superior 
levels of equality and productivity.   
 Notwithstanding these substantial contributions, and despite widespread and insistent 
advocacy of ‘trans-national’ history, a particularly significant lacuna remains in the history of 
tripartism: the historical role of the ILO and its interactions with other international and national-
level actors.
39
  The ILO’s foundation as the first tripartite international body gave institutional 
embodiment to the concept at global level.  Yet in common with other international organizations 
the ILO itself has felt constrained by current views of labour rights and its web of external 
relationships from elaborating on its own successes in the area.
40
   
 The ILO’s activities in support of tripartism, including how they were received by and 
impacted upon national collective institutions certainly require further research, which may be co-
ordinated under the umbrella of the ILO’s centenary history project.41  Until 1939, the ILO was a 
largely developed-world institution principally concerned with advancing employee welfare, 
cautious and bounded advocacy of collective institutions including in the colonial world and 
consolidating its own legitimacy.
42
  In the post-war period, its internal organization and the wider 
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context meant that it could play a significant role in developing tripartism.  It has been argued that 
its influence—and its emphasis on tripartism with it--declined greatly from the early 1980s 
essentially because of a major environmental shift: recession, the rise of neo-liberalism, and US 
global hegemony. Structural Adjustment Programmes and the resultant expansion of informal 
sectors all rendered institutional industrial relations less significant.
43
  Standing has argued that 
these developments brought an inadequate response from the ILO, suggesting that it lost influence 
in relation to the international financial bodies and essentially abandoned tripartism in favour of the 
‘Decent Work’ agenda.44   
 The view threatens to obscure important aspects of the ILO’s recent work and thereby 
diminish interest in examination of its long-standing role in advocating and implementing 
tripartism.  Tripartite institutions were created at both micro- and macro-level in several developing 
countries in the 21
st
 Century.
45
  As we have suggested above, some function remained for many 
forms of the institution, fuelled by increased demand for regulation by some developed country 
companies seeking to reduce reputational risk in their supply chains, a demand that has increased 
since the Rana Plaza fire.
46
  A higher contemporary profile for its activities seems likely to 
stimulate further investigation of its many-sided historic role.   
 
Conclusion: persistent and uneven tripartism 
A common theme across the papers in this collection is that whilst ambitious neo-corporatist deal 
making may be difficult to replicate, tripartism remains possible and, indeed, tripartite experiments 
continue regularly to manifest themselves in a wide range of different settings, a phenomenon that 
has been particularly evident outside of the better-known cases in European countries.  This reflects 
a second feature of tripartism highlighted in the collection: tripartite deals have varied greatly in 
content, scope and durability according to historical and indeed national circumstances.  In the case 
of Singapore, the relative policy autonomy of national government vis-à-vis external players 
allowed some scope for deal-making with the aim of helping secure the national policy objectives 
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of political and economic sustainability. In the case of the countries of Southern Africa, strong 
pressures militated towards deal making at a time when the transition to democracy was uncertain 
and fragile, but an aggressive counter-movement by employers and their allies in government 
occurred once stability had been secured.   
 
The prospects of tripartite deal-making are shaped by powerful international forces.   However, it is 
possible to over-estimate the power of international financial institutions and MNEs, and under-
estimate the need for supra-national legitimacy and stability. Whilst by no means a rare feature of 
social life, the economically beneficial effects of social instability and war are restricted to tiny élite 
factions, giving many business interests and other societal actors a real interest in alternatives. 
Thus, we argue that although tripartism’s heyday is clearly past, it remains a viable option and its 
history is therefore relevant both as a significant historic manifestation of social compromise and as 
a massive and diverse repository of experience.  Whilst, as we and our contributors have argued, 
lacunae undoubtedly remain, the contributions in this special edition constitute a considerable step 
forward in enlarging the stock of historical knowledge on which actors may draw.    As in relation 
to previous epochs, a very real risk exists of imparting a determinist analysis to the present and 
apparently endless economic crisis.  Whilst neo-liberalism may have proved remarkably durable, its 
difficulties with economic realities notwithstanding (as it is, after all, primarily a vehicle for elite 
enrichment), this does not mean that the public space for debating new ideas, or the possibility for 
political action and the adoption of meaningful alternatives, is absent. As the experience of different 
forms of tripartism around the world demonstrates, it remains possible even in very difficult 
circumstances, to bring about compromises that help secure political and economic sustainability, 
greater social equity, and, higher productivity than might otherwise have seemed possible.   
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